INTRODUCTION
Several studies have measured the effects of regulation on a particular industry.'
These studies range widely in sophistication, from simple observation (comparison) of "pre-transformation and post-transformation" actual industry performance to econometric analysis that attempt to separate the effects of deregulation from other factors in explaining changes in an industry's performance. The major problem with "observation" studies is that they are unable to measure the effect of one particular event, such as deregulation, on an industry's performance. For example, at the same time that the United Kingdom privatized its electric power industry, it also radically restructured the industry to encourage competition and instituted a price-cap mechanism to regulate the prices of transmission, distribution, and bundled retail services. Subsequent to these changes in 1991 , real prices for most U.K. electricity customers have fallen. ' We cannot say with high certainty, however, which of these factors was most important or even contributed to the decline in price. In any event,
one must be cautious in interpreting the results of studies that attempt to measure the effect of deregulation perse for a specific industry.
undergoing deregulation or major regulatory and restructuring reforms. These include the natural gas, transportation, U.K. electric power, financial, and telecommunications industries. Particular attention was given to the historical development of events in the telecommunications industry, which has long been regulated by state public utility
The summary that follows highlights major outcomes for five industries ' This report cites the more scholarly studies in its discussion of the evidence for individual industries. Other "data" on deregulation, including those from media accounts and anecdotal evidence, are omitted from our summary. rates and local service rates Noncompetition in "equipment" markets During the early 1980s, severe take-or-pay contract problems started to come to the surface. The market price for wellhead gas was frequently far below existing contract prices but pipelines were legally obligated to pay the contract prices. Take-orpay provisions in producer-pipeline contracts were the product of wellhead price regulation that positioned producers favorably in negotiating nonprice terms and conditions with pipelines. Take-or-pay provisions placed most pipelines in a financial bind in addition to driving up the price of gas throughout the natural-gas network.
Matters grew worse with the collapse of oil prices in 1985. As a consequence of these events, the demand for natural gas plummeted. In 1987, after judicial remand, the FERC issued Order 500.' This order addressed the take-or-pay problem by (a) requiring gas producers to credit against a pipeline's take-or-pay liability any gas transported for them, and (b) allowing pipelines to collect gas inventory charges for the provision of firm gas service.
services. Yet, for the first time, it gave pipeline customers the right to contract separately for gas supplies and transportation service. Although FERC actions in the 1980s helped to open up natural gas markets to competitive services, several problems emerged that the FERC later addressed in its 636 Orders. These problems included
As of that time, the FERC fell short of requiring pipelines to unbundle their "Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol," Order No. 436, FERC Statutes and Regulations, 30,665 (1 985).
A contract demand refers to the level of firm service in terms of the maximum (daily or annual)
Order No. 500, FERC Statutes and Regulations, 30,761 (1 987).
volumes of natural gas sold (or moved) by the pipeline to the customer holding the contract.
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the "unfair" position of pipelines as gas merchants, inefficient transportation rate design, discriminatory storage access and upstream pipeline capacity access, and a nonfunctioning resale market for pipeline capacity rights. In response to these problems, the FERC issued the 636 Orders in 1992.6
The Order prohibited pipelines from offering bundled sales service, established a capacity releasing program, redesigned pipeline rates on the basis of the straight fixedvariable (SFV) meth~dology,~ and generally gave transportation customers nondiscriminatory access rights to the pipeline network. In return for required unbundling of pipeline services, pipelines are able to resell gas on an unbundled basis at market-determined prices.
of gas services to small retail customers.8 Service unbundling, and rebundling of services, for a broader group of retail customers will be an important issue for state regulators in the coming years. One lesson we have learned is that once competition penetrates one sector component it is difficult to prevent it from spreading to other components. Retail gas unbundling exemplifies this phenomenon for the natural gas industry.
State public utility commissions (PUCs) have now begun to allow the unbundling The "old" natural gas industry featured a rigid three-tier structure with long-term contracting as the dominant form of gas transactions. Three distinct markets (wellhead, citygate, and local distribution) existed. Under this industry structure, gas was provided as a delivered bundled service from wellhead to burnertip. Interstate pipelines played a critical role in the delivering process. Strong technical and economic reasons underlaid the prevalence of this particular market struct~re.~ Under this three-tier structure, the natural gas industry performed satisfactorily over several decades. But, as noted earlier, this market structure led to major distortions and performed poorly during the mid-I 970s' supply shortage and the early to mid-I 980s' gas s~rplus.'~ Over the last ten years, a four-market (commodity gas, interstate transportation, core distribution, and noncore distribution) structure centered around direct gas purchases and spot contracts with flexible supply and take provisions has evolved. This four-market structure will likely remain over the next several years.
inception of wellhead deregulation in 1979 and pipeline reform in 1985 (see Table 3 ).
The nominal price of wellhead gas declined by 27 percent over the period of 1985 to 1994. Over the same period, prices to industrial customers declined by almost 23 percent, prices to electric utilities declined by almost 36 percent; in comparison, prices to commercial customers decreased by a little over 1 percent, while residential prices actually increased by almost 5 percent." Two explanations for the large declines in prices to large retail customers are: (1) these customers have had direct access to wellhead gas at market-based prices, and (2) a larger proportion of the price of delivered gas to large customers is made up of the wellhead price, which has declined more than the price of other gas services. If one adds up the decline in natural gas bills across all retail customers since 1984, however, the cost savings have been significant.
We observe widely different changes in prices across customer groups since the One economic reason was the existence of economies of scope -that is, the cost savings lo A serious distortion of the mid-I 980s was that gas supplies were plentiful but gas prices were resulting from one entity providing interrelated services or performing interrelated functions.
rising.
Historical prices for wellhead gas and individual retail customer classes can be found in United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review (Washington, D.C.: Energy Information Administration, November 1995), 125. It should be added that all retail customers have experienced large declines in gas prices when measured in real dollars. Other major outcomes since the mid-I 980s include major downsizing and productivity improvements by pipelines and distributor^,'^ the entry of new marketeers engaging in various market functions, the introduction of new unbundled gas services, the sharing of transition C O S~S , '~ no decline in the reliability of firm-gas servi~e.'~ Overall, the combination of wellhead deregulation starting in 1979 and pipeline reform starting in 1984 has engendered, as hoped for, a more dynamic competitive and less-regulated natural gas industry. Prior to this period, the natural gas industry was customers declined by 42 percent in real dollars.
l3 See American Gas Association, "Efficiency Gains in Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution," Energy Analysis (Arlington, VA: American Gas Association, 1996) . Between 1984 and 1993, for example, operating and maintenance expenses of local gas distributors and gas pipelines collectively declined by 35 percent in real dollars.
l4 A more detailed discussion of transition costs follows later in this paper.
l5 Firm service refers to t h e provision of gas service on demand.
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plagued with the twin problems of deficient wellhead price leading to severe gas shortages and excessive monopoly power exhibited by interstate pipelines in selling bundled sales service to local gas distributors. It should be pointed out that wellhead price regulation illustrates an example where regulation initially designed to benefit a particular group (consumers) ultimately ended up hurting them.16 Contrary to what many people had predicted or advanced for self-serving reasons, open access in gas transportation has not jeopardized service reliability.
While the natural gas industry has undergone major changes over the last ten years, it has not completed its transformation process. Competition in wholesale (interstate) gas markets has existed now for a number of years; while broad-based competition in retail markets is just now starting to emerge. Future activities will center on the retail gas market, where consumers will have more choices as local gas distributors unbundle their services. These activities will give a greater number of gas consumers the opportunity to directly benefit from competitive forces in the natural gas indu~try.'~ Marketeerdbrokers and aggregators will play a vital role in delivering natural gas as well as other services to small retail consumers, at competitive prices. 164 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission, 1988) . Much of the efficiency gains derived from timelier and more reliable service. Another source is the increase in labor productivity, which has averaged over 7 percent annually since 1980. 
TRANSPORTATION
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The effects of airline deregulation have been more provocative. Some critics have argued that airline service has deteriorated, safety has fallen, discriminatory pricing has become rampant, and the financial condition of the industry has become unstable." Although some of these allegations cannot be ignored, the most serious studies strongly suggest that airline deregulation has benefited passengers and society as a contributed significantly to reducing the industry's costs.
Studies on the deregulation of the airline industry contain other major conclusions. First, deregulation has not jeopardized airline safety.26 Second, price discrimination has become a dominant practice in the industry." Some debate still exists over whether price differentiation in fares reflect outright price discrimination or cost differences in serving different passengers or different routes. Although deregulation has resulted in competition-driven price discrimination, less crosssubsidies have occurred. Prior to deregulation long-haul markets were subsidizing short-haul markets largely to encourage air service to low-density routesF8 Third, To address the concern of small communities being harmed by airline deregulation, Congress enacted a program that subsidized these communities during a ten-year transition period.
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deregulation allowed airlines to compete on the basis of price. Prior to deregulation, airlines competed vigorously with regard to service quality and other nonprice factors?' Although deregulation has arguably caused the quality of airline service to decline, this should not necessarily be interpreted as a loss in society's or passengers' welfare. In fact, it can be argued that passengers generally have been willing to sacrifice some frills (e.g., a full-course meal) in return for lower fares. Given the freedom to choose among different fare-quality of service menus, it can be inferred that the observed menus are more compatible with consumer preferences.
issue is not whether quality of service would decline (which may happen) but whether the net benefit of any change would be positive or negative. One lesson from airline deregulation is that, as long as consumers have choices, they may be willing to accept lower quality of service in return for a lower price. quality of service. For example, a firm (e.g., Federal Express) could profit from offering higher quality service by charging a high price, which may not have been permitted under regulation. Further, as in the case of railroads, deregulation led to higher profits, which helped to fund long-neglected maintenance and capital improvement^.^^ The staff of the Federal Trade Commission estimated that these activities have saved shippers a substantial amount of dollars from timelier and more reliable railroad servi~e.~'
The implication for restructuring of the electric power industry is that the pertinent As is the case in some industries, deregulation may cause an increase in the Improvements in the performance of railroads since deregulation come from several sources. A major one was lifting the restrictions imposed upon the railroads to enter or exit specific routes. Railroads, for example, previously could not abandon 29 Some analysts have argued that, by the time of deregulation, most of the industry's economic rents had been expended on promoting service quality. 
U.K. ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
Much has been written on the experiences of the privatized U.K. electric power industry. The consensus is that, while privatization and restructuring of the industry has 32 These three sources of performance enhancements are discussed in Moore, "Clearing the Track: The Remaining Transportation Regulations." 38 Ibid. For example, since privatization fuel, labor, and other operating costs have declined significantly in real British pounds. Noteworthy is the almost 50 percent decline in the number of employees in the British electric power industry since privatization. It should also be noted that the capacity factor of nuclear power plants has increased by over 30 percent since privatization. 39 The evidence suggests that competition in generation was the most powerful force in improving. productivity in the U. K. electric power industry. 40 The outcomes of increased productivity, lower prices in real terms, and higher quality of services have also occurred in the privatized Chilean and Argentinean electric industries. See R. Peter Lalor and Hernan Garcia, "Reshaping Power Markets-Lessons from Chile and Argentina," Public Policy forfhe Private Sector, Quarterly No. 6 (March 1996) : 29-32. In the U.K., congestion occurrences on the transmission network, however, have resulted from poor pricing practices. Wales," 3.
Evans, "UK Electricity: the Criticisms, the Changes, the Challenges." to retain most of the significant efficiency gains that were realized.
46
The instituted price-cap regulation, especially during the initial years, allowed the distributors Peltzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation," 34.
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FINANCIAL
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elsewhere to place their money and for financial intermediaries to supply alternatives to bank deposits? As early as the late 1960s, it became obvious that interest-rate ceilings on bank time deposits were not ~ustainable.~~ Consequently, in 1970, the interest rates on time deposits were deregulated.
As with most other deregulated or less regulated industries, productivity in the banking industry grew dramatically. For example, between 1984 and 1993 the number of jobs in the industry fell by more than 20 percent, and more impressive, revenues per employee grew by more than 300 percent.53 on the kinds of services it could offer consumers, and on interstate banking operations. 
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S&Ls were already insolvent by the late 197Os, although not declared so by the federal regulators, prior to the period of financial dereg~lation.'~ Their insolvency, it is argued, can be traced to regulation itself, namely the interest-rate ceilings on savings deposits.
When inflation and interest rates started to skyrocket in the mid-I 970s, depositors in large numbers withdrew their deposits, placing the S&Ls in a financially distressed position.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
A qualitatively useful description of the history of the telecommunications industry is a cycle of regulation and deregulation running in parallel with a cycle of monopolization and competition. This history begins in 1876 with the issuance of U.S.
Patent No. 174, 465 . This patent is associated with Alexander Graham Bell's invention of the telephone set. It and another patent issued in 1877 generated the property rights that sustained the industry's first monopolization. The actual property rights were not secured by AT&T until 1879, however. In that year, AT&T and Western Union reached a settlement of AT&T's patent suit, wherein AT&T voluntarily terminated the suit after Western Union conceded the priority of AT&T's telephone patents and the companies agreed to license their patents to each ~t h e r .~' AT&T's ensuing patent monopoly in the telephone industry lasted until 1894 when the two patents expired. During this fifteento sixteen-year period, AT&T established its local telephone companies by leasing telephone instruments to companies and individuals that it had licensed to operate them.58 In fact, by 1879, AT&T had inked 185 contracts that gave it control over local 56 Ibid., England. In 1980, for example, only forty-three S&Ls (according to the author, a deficient number) were declared insolvent by the federal regulators, while 434 S&Ls were declared insolvent in 1988. Coterminous with the patent awards that laid the foundation for AT&T's monopoly, the Supreme Court released its 1877 decision on Munn v. specific issue was whether state of Illinois had the right to question and alter the rates that monopolistic grain operators charged for their elevator and warehousing services.
The larger public policy issue was: when is it appropriate for the government to intervene in the operation of an economic market, monopolistic or otherwise? The majority of the justices decided that intervention is proper and in the public interest when private property is put to use in a profit-making activity that has consequential effects on the economic well-being of the community. This decision established that the commonality of an economic effect affecting a large number of consumers is a necessary condition for regulation.
The
It is important to note that Munn v. ///inois does not state that the monopolization of a market guarantees its regulation. However, its monopolization certainly makes it easier for the government to conclude that the firm's profit-making activity has consequential effects on the economic well-being of the community. Therefore, AT&T's monopoly over local communications made it a target for regulation as soon as the government decided that the price and availability of telephone service had consequential economic effects on the community. Massachusetts was the first and only state government to reach this conclusion during the time period covering AT&T's monopoly. In 1885, Massachusetts decided to regulate telephone services and other public utility services such as electricity.61 decided to investigate the operation of a national market that it perceived as crucial to 
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the country's economic well-being. During the 1870s and 1880s, the railroad industry was at the center of the United States economic growth and geographic expansion.
The competition process, however, was simultaneously, extremely rivalrous and discriminatory. The industry was characterized by stable prices interspersed with episodes of price wars distinguished by price discrimination against customers with the more inelastic demands for railroad services.62 The price wars certainly did not promote the economic well-being of railroad owners or railroad workers. Obviously, they did not promote the economic well-being of the railroad users with the more inelastic demands for railroad services. Such wars did, however, improve the well-being of railroad users with the more elastic demands for services and the consumers of goods transported by rail.
When Congress concluded its investigation of the railroad industry, it decided to pass the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which allowed the federal government to assist in maintaining the stability at the industry and minimizing the discrimination in the prices of railroad services. These decisions were consistent with the theory of Munn v.
Illinois. The community of consumers directly affected adversely by the unregulated operation of the railroad industry was larger than the community directly experiencing positive economic effects. Arguably, it was, therefore, acceptable to legislate the federal regulation of interstate railroad rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
In 1887, Congress apparently did not believe that the operation of the national telephone service was harming the economic well-being of the United States. This belief is not unreasonable. AT&T was aggressively deploying local telecommunications facilities in an effort to take maximum advantage of its patent monopoly. Additionally, it was expanding the availability of long-distance telephone service in its efforts to compete with Western Union's telegraph services. Ibid. The non-Bell companies tried to enter the long-distance market in 1899 by building their own long lines, but this effort failed.
Ibid.
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Perhaps fearful of the threat of regulation or the penalties associated with newly passed antitrust laws, AT&T agreed in 1913 to stop its acquisition program and to interconnect non-Bell local companies to its long-distance One interpretation of this agreement is that it eliminated most incentives to build an alternate long-distance its authority over market entry to create a de jure long-distance monopoly for AT&T.69
Whichever is correct, the ICC did not do much economic regulation under the Mann- 
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was that the FCC had never concluded that the competitive supply of switched services was not in the public interest, and consequently, MCI could not be denied the use of its facilities for the purpose of providing such services to the public. The D.C. Circuit indicated, however, that the FCC could convene a hearing on the matter of whether the competitive supply of switched access services is in the public interest. The FCC did not shun this offer.
Shortly after the Execunef I Decision, the FCC opened a docket in 1978 to determine whether interstate toll service is a for two years, and the FCC concluded in 1980 that the sale of interstate toll services on a competitive basis was in the public intere~t.'~ During this two years, however, the FCC tried to limit the public's access to Execunet by ruling that AT&T did not have a current obligation to interconnect its competitors' toll services to its local distribution facilities. The D.C. Circuit Court rebuked this decision, and it ordered interconnection without any further ado.94 The public was becoming accustomed to competition in interstate toll services, and the appeals court had signaled quite clearly that it would not make any decisions that would limit the availability of competitive alternatives.
Perhaps, the FCC's only politically feasible conclusion was to find that the competitive supply of these services was in the public interest.
Whatever the reason, the close of the docket on market structure for interstate United Telecommunications planned a large-scale entry into the interstate market using digital and fiber optic technologies. These activities marked the beginning of facilitiesbased competition in the interstate market.
A significant event in the history of telecommunications occurred before United
Telecommunications' large-scale entry into the interstate market. AT&T settled a longrunning antitrust relationships between AT&T's manufacturing company and AT&T's long-distance and local exchange companies. The government contended that AT&T was improperly excluding other companies that manufactured telecommunication equipment from making sales to AT&T's long-distance and local exchange companies. The suit was settled in 1982 when AT&T proposed the divestiture of its local exchange companies and, further, to obligate these companies to provide "equal access" to AT&T's facilitiesbased competitor^.^^ The equal access condition opened a Pandora's Box of access and interconnection issues to be discussed subsequently.
The overriding issue associated with any antitrust suit is the promotion of competition. In 1974, the United States government wanted to promote competition in the manufacturing and sale of telecommunications equipment. This is not surprising because competition in the interstate private line services market was just getting underway. Consequently, the government initially sought to require AT&T to divest itself of Western Electric, subsequently including the divestiture of a portion of Bell negotiated rates characterized the alternative interconnection market.98 Consequently, the government's priorities in terms of reaching a settlement of the antitrust suit had to change once again. It could promote competition in the interstate market if it settled its antitrust suit in return for the divestiture of AT&T's local exchange companies and equal access for the alternative interexchange carriers.
An equal-access tariff was based on the cost of providing this service to AT&T's competitors.99 However, no one knew this because the service did not exist. With the support and assistance of all interstate carriers, the FCC used the lack of this cost information to shift the responsibility for the recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs from interstate toll calls to intrastate toll and local calls. Their all out cost-shifting effort began with the claim that the cost of nontraffic sensitive facilities nof direcf/y assignable to interstate toll calls should be recovered from the rates for local basic service. The counter claim put forth by state regulatory commissions and consumer groups was that the mere implementation of equal access should not change the responsibility for the recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs. Not surprisingly, a heated and vigorous debate and jurisdictional battles ensued. In the end, as expected, neither side was able to uphold its initial claim. The best that the FCC could do was to shift some of the responsibility for the recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs to local callers. This "victory" for the FCC guaranteed price reductions for long-distance callers during the years immediately succeeding AT&T's divestiture. However, these price reductions actually represented nothing more than a rate redistribution. As the price per unit of interstate calling fell, the monthly fee for local basic service rose.
In re Exchange Network Facilities for Interexchange Access, 71 FCC2d 440 (1 979).
99 This access service was never really equal. A long-running debate arose over providing an equal-access 800 number interconnection arrangement to AT&Ts competitors. AT&Ts competitors complained about the "equality" of adjunct devices as substitutes for Feature Group D in geographic areas when the supply of Feature Group D was not economically feasible. The AT&T-instigated differences in call set-up times between Feature Group C and Feature Group D were a constant source of annoyance to AT&T's competitors and the regulators that had to hear their complaints. Feature Group C was the equal-access service that was available only to AT&T immediately after the divestiture. Feature Group D was the equal-access service that was available to AT&Ts competitors immediately after the divestiture. The call set-up time for a Feature Group C call was slightly faster than the call setup time for a Feature Group D call.
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The availability of equal access service did not immediately affect the regulation of AT&T. Conventional regulation in the tradition of the FCC continued until the emergence of plans for large-scale entry on a facilitates basis into the interstate telecommunications market. AT&T's profits were regulated using the principles of slowmoving ratebasehate-of-return regulation. Its rates for interstate services were reviewed and approved by the FCC. These rates were set using cost-of-service principles. Changes to these rates were justified in terms of average embedded costs, while the competitive implication of not changing these rates was placed in a subordinate role.
The character of AT&T's rate regulation by the FCC changed around 1984. Prior to that time, many important regulatory decisions were based on an analysis of the average cost of producing an interstate service. In 1984 and thereafter, the basis for most federal regulatory decisions was an analysis of AT&T's average incremental cost of producing a service. This change meant that AT&T's rates had to cover at least the incremental cost of producing a service. However, meeting this requirement was only a threshold test of regulatory sufficiency. AT&T's new rates also had to pass a "net revenue" test, which was designed to ensure that all of AT&T's customers benefited in some sense from a price decrease.
America" and "Pro-America" tariffs. These tariffs were characterized by volume discounts for residential customers. The innovation of the Pro-America tariff was that the volume discounts were conjoined with a monthly access fee. The new regime also produced Tariff 12 and Tariff 16. Tariff 12 is available only to very large business users with seemingly special needs. It allows AT&T to offer custom-designed volume discounts to specific customers without the requirement that similar discounts be offered to other customers. Tariff 16 is a competitive-necessity tariff that permits AT&T to respond on a targeted basis to the marketing efforts that its competitors undertook to win over medium-to-large-volume business customers. All four of these tariffs were vigorously opposed by AT&T's competitors on the grounds that they were anticompetitive. In effect, the competitive implications of tariff proposals took on the The first two tariffs approved under the new tariff regime were the "Reach out Conduct, 75 FERC 61,078 (April 24,1996) . pricing in the early to mid-I 980s was not associated with the destruction of rate-ofreturn regulation. AT&T's profits remained regulated, and it still had to conform to the tariff procedures adopted in an earlier industry era. The major change in the regulation of AT&T up until the implementation of price-cap regulation was that it was given the flexibility to change its prices more rapidly.
Third, rapid and flexible price changes by a traditionally regulated firm is made possible by either an explicit or implicit grant of permission for it to engage in market segmentation. In practice, market segmentation is merely price discrimination for competitive purposes. As shown as early as the 1870s for the railroad industry, market segmentation means that customer classes with elastic demand schedules experience rapid price reductions, while those with inelastic schedules experience price increases or less rapid price reductions. AT&T's pattern of volume discounting during the first half of the 1980s conforms to the discrimination pattern associated with the railroad industry.. Fourth, the regulation of a dominant former monopolist did not change until the FCC was convinced that facilities-bases competitior, was firmly established in the interstate market. US Telecom, the long-distance subsidiary of United Telecommunications, and GTE Sprint, the long-distance subsidiary of GTE Telephone Companies, had mergered to form US Sprint before the FCC adopted price-cap regulation for AT&T. In addition, US Sprint was nearing the completion of the digital/fiber optic network planned by US Telecom and its predecessor company-United Telecommunications Communications incorporated. Furthermore, other regional facility-based carriers, such as Litel, were establishing themselves.
Finally, MCI was in the process of upgrading its network. competition agreeably. Throughout its history, AT&T has never backed down from an opportunity to stop, slow down, or elimination the competition that was emerging in its markets. When its patent monopoly expired, AT&T tried to renew its patents. When that failed, it tried to modify its telephone equipment just enough to gain a new patent monopoly. When that failed, it refused to interconnect non-Bell local-exchange Fifth, the former monopolist should not be expected to take the introduction of Sixth, the divestiture of bottleneck and essential facilities by the former monopolist does not guarantee the removal of all competitive problems in the market that relies on the nondiscriminatory availability of bottleneck and essential facilities. As part of the settlement of the antitrust suit filed against it, AT&T chose to divest its local exchange companies and obligate them to provide AT&T's competitors with an access service that was approximafely equal to the access service available to AT&T.
Problems with access services persisted for many years after the initial equal-access service was available to AT&T's competitors.
Seventh, a former monopolist is in the position to behave anticompetitively even if it does not control bottleneck and essential facilities. It was repeatedly argued by AT&T's competitors that AT&T's series of volume-discounts tariffs were predatory at worst and anticompetitive at best. These arguments were not completely specious, and they resulted in the institutionalization of the net revenue test. In addition to ensuring that all consumers benefited, in perhaps different ways, from the availability of volume discounts, the net revenue test greatly increased the probability that the volume discounts would not be predatory under normal operating conditions. When the FCC decided to remove its structural separation requirement for AT&T's enhanced and basic telecommunications services, non-affiliated enhanced services providers and others argued that it would not be possible to police AT&T's incentive and capability to shift unregulated costs into regulated markets as it sought to expand into unregulated telecommunications services. A U.S. Appeals Court agreed with these arguments.'02 Eighth, it is possible to control the pace at which a new public policy is implemented. It is often heard that the interstate telecommunication industry is undergoing the transition to deregulation. History indicates that this transition began in the mid-1980s for the interstate market with the change in the focus of the FCC's review of AT&T's pricing. It is now 1997, and AT&T still is not completely deregulated with respect to its production and sale of interstate telecommunications services.
AT&T's sale of telecommunications equipment and inside wiring was actually deregulated in about the same number of years. This deregulation effort began with the Carterfone Decision in 1968.'03 It overturned those elements of AT&T's tariffs that prevented the attachment of non-Bell devices to telephone sets and those portions of the tariffs that did not allow AT&T's customers to interconnect their communications systems directly to the Bell System network. Deregulation of customer premises equipment was finalized in 1980 when the FCC released its Second Computer lnquiry Decision.'04 These two decisions and the subsequent judicial reviews show that a public utility industry can be deregulated on a piece-meal basis. However, they also indicate that the first pieces of the industry to be deregulated are peripheral to the transmission and distribution of the regulated services. Cir. 1990 ). Telephone Services, 13 FCC2d 420,423, 426 (1968 ), reconsideration denied, 14 FCC2d 571 (1968 Federal Communications Commission, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982 ), cert. denied 461 U.S. 938 (1983 ), modified. 3 FCCR 22 (1988 .
IO3 In re Use of fhe Carferfone Device in Message Toll
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Ninth, qualitative and quantitative data have to be considered jointly when examining the effects of changes in regulatory formats and focal points. The need for the dual consideration of both kinds of data is illustrated by the following examination of post-divestiture interstate toll prices. The analysis begins with the equal-access service that was provided to all interstate common carriers after AT&T's di~estiture.''~ The rates for these tariffs were set using traditional cost-of-service principles, which required the identification and separation of interstate and intrastate access costs. Since the FCC had never set access rates, it was able to start this exercise with a clean slate.
The major cost classifications in the years preceding the divestiture were local service, intrastate toll service, and interstate toll service. Each of these classifications made contributions to the recovery of traffic sensitive and nontraffic sensitive costs. Prior to this Supreme Court decision, the rates for local service had been the tool for the recovery of all nontraffic sensitive costs. This court decision also indicated that a usage-based allocation of nontraffic sensitive costs to local and long-distance services is acceptable, even though nontraffic sensitive costs, by definition, do not vary with telephone usage.
Smith v. Illinois set in motion a sequence of events that consistently resulted in the long-distance callers having more and more responsibility for the recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs. The cost burden laid on interstate rates was not a problem before the Above 890 Decision. AT&T had a complete monopoly over the longdistance market, and the FCC routinely approved interstate rates that would recover the nontraffic sensitive costs that were deemed to be the responsibility of its long-distance subsidiary. The legalization of private microwave networks, however, indicated that AT&T could not indefinitely use the rates for private line services to recover nontraffic sensitive costs. Further increases for these rates might induce one or more large corporations to build their own telecommunications networks. In fact, the current rate levels for private-line service had already caused this to happen.
for private-line and message-toll service. Telpak was the first move in this direction. Its volume discounts implied that the large-volume users of private line services would contribute less to the recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs. This strategic move to keep corporations on its network, however, created another problem for AT&T. The principles of traditional regulation required that the unrecovered (actually unsupported) nontraffic sensitive costs had to be supported elsewhere. The support role fell to the remainder of the interstate users.
Private-line competitors set in motion the process of "rebalancing" AT&T's rates A subset of the remaining interstate users included those private line users whose usage levels were not large enough to justiQ the construction and ownership of private microwave networks. Consequently, AT&T with the approval of the FCC could raise the rates for these customers to just below the level that would induce these customers to build their own networks. MCl's 1983 application to sell private line services as a common carriers, however, put this population at risk as a source for the recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs. The switch-over rate for these customers was no longer the per unit cost of constructing a private network for their own use. Instead, it was the lower per unit cost of constructing a private network for the shared use of multiple private line customers. Therefore, traditional regulation once again forced AT&T to rebalance its interstate rates after the FCC approved MCl's application to be a common carrier of private line services.
After the Specialized Common Carrier Decision, competitive options became increasingly available to interstate private line users. Consequently, the interstate
THE NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE-35
message toll service callers became the primary source for the recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs. Sufficient increases in the prices of interstate message toll services, however, would induce some of these users to switch to an alternative common carrier.
MCI moved to take advantage of this opportunity because its private line service was not doing very well. After providing alternative voice-grade services for some time under its Execunet tariff, MCI petitioned to be an alternative common carrier. It was granted its petition in 1975. It also was provided with the right to resell AT&T's WATS lines, which meant that MCI did not have to build interstate transmission facilitates before it could sell a substitute for AT&T's interstate toll message service. With MCI and others selling private line and toll services, AT&T and the FCC had no other place to go in the interstate market for the purpose of rebalancing the responsibility for the recovery of nontraffic sensitive costs. Perhaps, it was at that time that the FCC decided that it had to reduce the amount of nontraffic sensitive costs that were subject to its Both groups viewed the FCC's plan for the recovery of interstate nontraffic sensitive costs to be equivalent to an increase in the price of local basic service. After all, the SLC had to be paid even if a subscriber did not make any long-distance calls.
but it was not successful in using the SLC to recover all of the interstate nontraffic sensitive costs. Instead, the FCC had to settle for recovery of half of these costs through the SLC. Still, the amount of nontrafffic sensitive costs that had found its way into the prices of interstate message toll services had been reduced further.
Despite the opposition, the FCC implemented its proposed two-part access tariff, Neither the SLC nor the Gross Allocator was implemented on a "flash-cut" basis.
Consequently, it took time for the full impact of these regulatory changes to be reflected in the prices of interstate toll service. This time lag meant that the prices of interstate toll services would fall steadily without any changes or improvements to the process used to produce these services. Conversely, it meant that the price of local basic service would rise over the same time period if there were not any cost-saving changes to the process used to produce this telephone service.
The impact of the SLC was first felt by residential customers on interstate toll rates in June of 1985. Table 5 and 1987. Perhaps, part of the explanation lies in the voluntary retirements that AT&T offered its employees during this period. Another part of the explanation of these price declines might be the investment "write-offs" and "write-downs" that AT&T took to better its competitive position. Still, another part of the explanation might be productivity increases from those workers and managers that remained with AT&T. Finally, there were the optional calling plan, special needs, and competitive necessity tariffs that were introduced during this period.
Clearly, the phase-in of the SLC, the Gross Allocator and innovative tariffs cannot explain the price declines that occurred from 1988 forward. All of their effects had petered out by that time. However, the FCC introduced price-cap regulation in 1988. The dominant incentive of this alternative regulatory format is cost reduction. Nothing else occurred that could be expected to substantially alter the competitiveness of the interstate toll market from 1988 to 1992. Consequently, the explanation for the more modest price reductions experienced during this period appears to be productivity increases, lay offs, and pricing responses to competitive pressures.
The upsurge in interstate toll prices in 1993 and thereafter has been more substantial than the general increase in prices during the period 1993 through 1996. Table 5 , a modified reproduction of Table 5 .2 from the Joint Board Monitoring Report,
shows the annual rate of changes in the more general price indices applicable to the telephone industry. The data show increases for these years in the price index for all items of around 2 to 3 percent. The data also show increases for the same year in the price index for all telephone services of around 0 to 2 percent. Meanwhile, the data (in Table 4 ) show increases in the CPI for interstate toll services for these years of around
The prices of interstate toll services have been increasing at one and one-half to 4 to 6 percent.
two times the increases in the prices of all items. This trend suggests that the price increases in interstate toll services are being used to partly compensate for price reductions that are being offered to large-volume interstate customers that use services other than interstate They also suggest the possibility that interstate toll services are being used to support unregulated businesses that are owned or controlled by all of the three large domestic interstate carriers. These hypotheses are plausible because it is unlikely that AT&T and the other interstate carriers have exhausted all of their transmission. AT&T's second liberalization of its interconnection policies was part of a package designed to settle an antitrust suit. AT&T agreed to divest its local companies more to obligate then to provide "equal access" to it and its competitors.
'09 Joint Board, Reporf, 448. to ONA services that are also useful to the affiliated enhanced and information service providers. The unaffiliated companies find it tough going, however, to get ONA services that do not fit into the business plans of the affiliated companies."' For example, the unaffiliated companies have been seeking access to the local companies' operating and support systems for almost ten years.
Twelfth, the development of interconnection arrangements to solve the competitive-access problem occurs in fits and starts. This erratic approach to interconnection exists for a variety of reasons. It is never exactly clear on logical grounds that the owner of the interconnection facilities will encourage efficiency in either The interstate commerce clause has already reared its head in the electric power industry. EPAct gives control to the FERC over the rates, terms and conditions of wholesale sales. The right to regulate retail services is reserved for the states. EPAct did not draw a distinction between interstate and intrastate wholesale and retail services, however. EPAct gives control to the FERC over the rates, terms and conditions for transmission service used in both bundled and unbundled wholesale-sales service without any direction as to jurisdiction over transmission used in unbundled retail sales. The FERC leapt on this omission in "The Final Rule" by asserting jurisdiction over transmission service used in interstate commerce to complete an unbundled retail sale when the unbundled retail sale is offered voluntarily by the utility or mandated by the state regulatory commission.
'I4 Charles G. Stalon, "Some Thoughts and Concerns About FERC Wheeling Policies," address THE NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH FCC the authority to regulate interstate communications and the ancillary services associated with interstate communications. Meanwhile, the state regulators often have to rely on statutory constructions which reserve for them everything that is not expressly given to the federal regulators.
without the cooperation of the state regulators. The interstate commerce clause provides a presumption that the FERC has the right to act unilaterally in the area of interstate transmission services. Furthermore, the federal courts in an important telecommunications case have decided that federal policies take precedence over state policies when state policies frustrate or impede the progress of a federal policy.'16 Fourteenth, federal regulators can push forward their pro-competition policies Fifteenth, competition is initially a transition to dominance. Monopoly is the pretransition market structure, and the dissolution of the monopoly is not equivalent to the dissolution of the former monopolist. Typically, the former monopolist remains in the market as a formidable competitor with a relatively large market hare."^ Its preexisting ties with customers provide it with several advantages, such as the benefits of customer inertia and name recognition. In addition, the former monopolist possesses market power over prices that it can exercise against large segments of its customer base because of the uneven introduction of competition across customer classes.
Factors along these lines were sufficiently strong to cause AT&T to be a dominant firm for some time after it had relinquished its control over bottleneck facilities."' "* Pursuant to FERC Order 888, electric utilities are not required to divest themselves of their transmission and distribution facilities. These facilities constitute bottlenecks with respect to unbundled wholesale and retail electricity services. The electric utilities also are highly recognizable in the wholesale and retail markets; and they can exercise market power over large segments of their retail customers. Consequently, it is virtually certain that electric utilities will be dominant in the retail market regardless of whether they divest themselves of their generation assets.
